Check Point Gateways Were Hacked Through PHP2Shell and a Root Exploit, Then a Wiper Hit the VMware Hosts Behind Them

Somewhere behind a perimeter firewall, an attacker logged into a VMware ESXi host over SSH and ran a program called destroy_v6. It deleted files without regard to their extension and, by default, tried to overwrite them with zeros first. The note left behind, named DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt, refused to negotiate a ransom.

That is where a campaign against Check Point Security Gateways ended up, according to a Check Point Research report published on November 12. It matters well beyond one vendor, and it landed in a week when US federal agencies were ordered to act on part of it.

How the attackers got in

The way in was the Mobile Access portal, the remote-access front door on unpatched gateways. Attackers exploited PHP2Shell, the name for two critical flaws in PHP tracked as CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619, to gain a foothold. They then used a separate privilege-escalation flaw in Check Point’s Gaia operating system, CVE-2026-123039, to become root.

BleepingComputer describes that Gaia flaw as a newly disclosed zero-day. Once the attackers had root on the gateway, they installed PHP webshells, a backdoor called TSGA with a proxy component named TSProxy, and a scanner called gogo.

From there they moved sideways. Using the vpxuser account, they connected over SSH to a VMware ESXi host, which is the kind of machine that runs many virtual servers at once. Destroying data there reaches far deeper than defacing a gateway.

Two waves, one narrow window

Check Point says the first wave began on October 30 and targeted Israeli organizations, with destructive activity against some of them. A broader second wave followed on November 2, hitting organizations across multiple countries and sectors, with no evidence of destructive activity. Exploitation stayed active until November 4.

The scale, by Check Point’s own account, was modest. In its blog advisory, VP of Research Lotem Finkelstein said that “Only a couple of dozen unpatched systems, in a single region, were compromised.” Many of those gained a network foothold, and a limited number involved destruction. Affected customers have been notified.

That figure comes from Check Point alone. No independent victim list exists, and no victims have been named publicly. The company’s blog says “systems” while its support advisory says “customers,” and neither names the region. Readers should be wary of turning “a single region” into a specific country.

The patch timeline is messier than it looks

A hotfix for PHP2Shell was available from October 23, and PHP itself shipped fixes on October 21 in versions 8.5.12, 8.4.27, 8.3.36 and 8.2.35. The fix for the Gaia flaw arrived later, in the November Jumbo Hotfix, after the attack window had closed. It is included in R82.20 Take 14, R82.10 Take 52, R82 Take 132 and R81.20 Take 174.

So no single patch would have stopped the whole chain. An administrator who applied the October hotfix would have closed the entry point but not the route to root. Until the Jumbo Hotfix, the interim mitigation was to stop the dynamic_server process.

One gap remains. Check Point’s advisory also lists R81.10 and R81, both past end of support, as affected, but names no fix for them.

Why Washington is paying attention

On November 13, CISA added CVE-2026-123039 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog. The federal due date is today, November 16. The entry calls for forensic triage under BOD 26-04, which means agencies must check whether they were compromised, not just install an update. CISA lists ransomware use as “Unknown.”

The agency’s alert also urges that all organizations “adopt risk-based vulnerability management.” CISA does not publish compliance results, and there is no reporting yet on how agencies fared.

The PHP2Shell flaws had already been in the catalog since October 26, with a federal deadline of October 29. Exploitation was visible early too: a Perplexity researcher, Adel Karimi, recorded what appeared to be the first successful in-the-wild attacks on honeypots on October 24 and 25.

Who is behind it remains unclear

Check Point is cautious here, and so should everyone else be. Its research report says the evidence “does not allow us to assess with high confidence” the true nature of the operation. The company’s blog calls the destructive activity ideologically motivated, while the research report stops short of establishing a clear motive.

The technical clues point in different directions. TSGA and TSProxy are Check Point-specific variants of PhiliKit, a framework previously documented in attacks on Ivanti VPN appliances. The tooling is linked to a malware family that ESET associated with a China-nexus group. But a destructive, Israel-focused campaign does not fit that group’s known behavior, according to Check Point.

Separately, Dream Security published research in late October on China-nexus exploitation of PHP2Shell against Palo Alto Networks devices. The wiper note in the Check Point case uses the Dream Security name. Beyond that coincidence of branding, the evidence does not support firm conclusions. The note also references the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which is one more reason to treat attribution claims with care until better evidence appears.

The lesson sits at the edge of the network

The details differ, but the pattern is familiar: a remote-access portal on a security appliance became the way in. PHP2Shell is a flaw in PHP itself that also affects Check Point gateways, so the exposure is not limited to one vendor. Check Point’s own blog advisory lists the affected versions and indicators for defenders.

The destructive stage matters most. The attackers did not stop at the gateway. They reached a virtualization host, the kind of system many organizations treat as safely interior. For defenders, that is the part worth rehearsing: what an attacker can reach from a compromised gateway, and how fast data can disappear once they do.

What to watch next

Several questions are still open. The PHP Foundation has said a third PHP flaw, CVE-2026-115560, would be fixed in a regular release, and it is not yet confirmed whether that fix has shipped. Check Point has not attributed the campaign, and Israeli authorities and victim organizations have made no public statements that have surfaced.

The first test of CISA’s forensic-triage requirement comes now that the deadline has arrived. If agencies find compromises, the outcome could say more about this campaign’s true reach than Check Point’s count of a couple of dozen. For anyone running Check Point gateways, the practical step is already clear: apply the November Jumbo Hotfix, and assume nothing about what happened behind the gateway until you have looked.